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Abstract- Routing is the process of forwarding data across 
an inter-network from a designated source to a final 
destination. Along the way from source to destination, at 
least one intermediate node is considered. Due to the major 
role that routing protocols play in computer network 
infrastructures, special cares have been given to routing 
protocols with built-in security constraints. In this paper, 
we evaluate the performance of EIGRP routing protocol in 
the case of secured and non-secured routing traffic. This is 
done through studying and analyzing EIGRP routing traffic 
with and without security rules. A network model of four 
Cisco routers, from both software and hardware 
perspectives, has been employed and a traffic generation 
and analysis tools have been developed and used to 
generate traffic data and to measure the delay for 
performance evaluation. The results show that the average 
delay in the secured case can become significantly larger 
than the unsecured case even in steady state conditions. 
The differences between the delays are exponential and 
reach a steady state towards the end of the experiment.  
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The past few years have witnessed an ever-growing 
reliance on computer networks for business transactions. 
With the free flow of data and the high availability of 
computer resources, owners and managers of enterprise 
networks have to secure their resources from any possible 
threats to their networks. Although these threats take many 
forms, they all result in loss of privacy to some degree and 
in malicious use of information or resources that can 
eventually lead to large monetary losses.  
 
Over the past few years, a number of research works have 
been done in routing [1], [2], and [3]. In [1], for example, 
an experimental setup was developed to capture all packets 
crossing a router for 13 hours and give statistics about their 
delay characteristics. The experiment showed that in-router 
packet processing time accounts for a significant portion of 
the overall packet delay and should not be neglected.  
Accordingly, a solution to directly report router delay 
information based on busy period statistics has been 
proposed. Also, in [2], the authors presented an 
approximate model for measuring the time from which a 
burst transmission request is received by a source to the 
time at which the last packet in the burst passes through the 
router. The results showed that burst delay offers acceptable 
performance only in the blowup region obtained for router 
delay even for small values of router utilization. Eventually, 
in [3], the security of the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) 
and its cost were analyzed and evaluated in terms of 
performance and delay. The work identified a number of 
threats involving the deception, disruption, and disclosure 
of BGP routing message traffic, and minimized most of 
these threats. Indeed, the authors showed that it is possible 
to effectively and efficiently secure the BGP routing 
protocol. 
 
In this paper, we will evaluate the performance of EIGRP 
routing traffic in two contexts: secured and un-secured. To 
meet this objective, a network test-bed model of four Cisco 
routers has been employed. A traffic generation and 
analysis tools have been developed to generate traffic data 
and to measure the delay for performance evaluation.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 
2 describes the EIGRP routing protocol. Section 3 presents 
the authentication technique used to secure the EIGRP, 
namely the MD5 authentication. Section 4 presents the real 
model of Cisco routers proposed in this work and outlines 
the operations and the interactions among the four routers. 
Section 5 is about the results of our experimental work and 
the performance evaluation. Finally, in Section 6 we 
summarize our current work, and lay down the milestones 
for the future work. 
 
2 EIGRP routing protocol 
Due to the major role of routing protocols in network 
infrastructures, special attentions have been given to 
routing protocols with built-in security functionalities [4]. 
The same distance vector technology found in IGRP is also 
 
used in EIGRP and the underlying distance information 
remains unchanged [5]. 
 
EIGRP [6] is an intra-domain routing protocol that 
leverages the strong points of both distance-vector and link-
state protocols: it converges quickly while remaining loop 
free at all times. This is achieved by using a system of 
diffused computation where every route calculation is 
computed in a coordinated fashion among multiple routers. 
EIGRP is based on the Diffusing Update Algorithm 
(DUAL) which is used to compute shortest paths in a 
distributed manner and without ever creating routing-table 
loops or incurring counting-to-infinity behavior.  
 
EIGRP’s updates are similar to a distance-vector protocol, 
as they are vectors of distances transmitted only to directly 
connected neighbors. However, the updates are partial, non-
periodic, and bounded. They are partial since the updates 
contain only the changed routes, and not the entire routing 
table. They are only sent whenever a metric or topology 
change occurs (non-periodic), and they are sent to the 
affected routers only (bounded). EIGRP has shown to 
provide loop freedom and quick convergence in medium-
scale networks. 
 
To determine the path cost function of EIGRP, the formula 
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where b is the minimum bandwidth measured in kilobits per 
second; l the load on the link expressed as a number from 0 
to 255 (255 is 100 percent loading), d the total delay in unit 
of tens of milliseconds, and r the reliability along the length 
of the path 255 for 100 percent. k1, k2, k3, k4 and k5 are 
administrator-configurable coefficients (although the values 
must be consistent across the domain). However, even this 
calculation is complicated by the need to scale bandwidth 
and delay as b = (256 x 108) / b0 and d = 256d0 , where b0 
and d0 are the measured or configured values; the 256 
arises from a storage difference (from IGRP to EIGRP) 
between 24 and 32 bits. Indeed, it is claimed that the default 
coefficient values of k1=1, k2=0, k3=1, k4=0 & k5=0 lead 
to the simplified path cost of C = b + d [7]. 
 
Recently, network architects state that EIGRP is being 
implemented in approximately half of the networks [8]. 
EIGRP is not only an enterprise-oriented routing protocol, 
but also a protocol that can be used in service-provider 
environments because it has fewer topology limitations than 




The damage that can be done in an unsecured routing 
infrastructure is so enormous that special precautions have 
to be taken into consideration. Modifying routing tables 
maliciously can cause significant network traffic to be 
diverted to the wrong destination. In general, a non-secure 
routing infrastructure degrades the performance of routers 
when they are intentionally or unintentionally miss-
configured. Unfortunately, no widely deployed secure 
routing protocols are used today. The current way of 
protecting routing infrastructures relies on so-called best 
practices, which include various simplistic techniques such 
as firewalls, intrusion detection systems, authentication 
Message Digest (MD5), route filters, and private addressing 
[9]. Authentication occurs when any router ensures that 
only routing updates received from a trusted neighbor are 
used. This prevents a router from accepting and using 
unauthorized, malicious, or corrupted routing updates that 
may compromise the security or availability of the network, 
and lead, for example, to rerouting of traffic or a denial of 
service [10].  
 
Figure 1: MD5 Algorithm; F: is a nonlinear function of (B, 
C, and D) 
 
The well known MD5 algorithm [11] operates on a 128-bit 
state, which are divided into four 32-bit blocks and denoted 
by A, B, C and D as shown in Figure 1. The algorithm 
processes 512-bit message block in a round. Each message 
block modifies the MD5 state by performing 16 similar 
operations in a round. Each operation uses a non-linear 
function F, a modular addition, and a shift left rotation 
respectively. Figure 1 illustrates one operation. 
 
In MD5 authentication, the participating routers must share 
an authentication key. This key must be manually 
preconfigured on each router. For EIGRP, multiple keys 
can be used for authentication. Each key is associated with 
a number, which must be the same for all the routers and 
never be sent over the wire. Each router uses a combination 
of this number and the traffic data as inputs to the MD5 
 
algorithm to produce a message digest called hash. Figure 2 
illustrates the sequence of events involved in MD5 
authentication for the sending router. 
 
Figure 2: MD5 Neighbor Authentication at the Originating 
Router 
 
The MD5 algorithm takes the preconfigured shared secret 
key and the traffic data (or message) as inputs and returns a 
message digest (hash) that is appended to the message and 
sent through the appropriate interface. Figure 3 illustrates 
the sequence of events for routing protocol authentication at 
the destination router. 
  
 
Figure 3: The Sequence of Events at the Destination Router 
 
EIGRP supports only keyed MD5 cryptographic checksums 
to provide authentication of traffic data including routing 
updates. Each key is represented by key number, key string, 
and key identifier, which are stored locally. EIGRP MD5 
authentication supports multiple keys, which are grouped in 
one keychain. Each key has a lifetime period that validates 
the usage of this key for sending and receiving. The router 
selects one key from the keychain for sending an 
authentication packet. The key numbers are examined from 
the lowest to the highest, and the first valid key encountered 
is used [12]. 
 
4 The test-bed network model 
We intended to use available simulators to study the 
performance of EIGRP routing with and without security 
constraints. However, an intensive survey of the available 
simulators has revealed the fact that none of them supports 
authentication commands. Therefore, our network model 
has been experimentally implemented in our research lab 
using physical CISCO 1721 routers. Our End-to-End 
Experimental model consists of four Cisco 1721 modular 
access routers. A traffic generator is plugged into a 
randomly chosen router at one end targeting any of the 
remaining routers. At the targeted router, the average traffic 
delays are computed. This communication of traffic is 
implemented using a java client/server program running on 
terminals attached to the designated routers. In the next 
section, the experiment and simulation settings and 
configurations of the routers are explained in details. 
 
 
Figure 4: The Proposed Real Model of CISCO Routers 
 
 
5 Experimental work and results 
This section represents the actual experiment settings and 
routers configurations in both secured and unsecured 
modes. Simulation construction includes traffic patterns 
used, time synchronization among all routers, end client 
and server and other issues. 
 
5.1 Setup and configuration of the routers  
The test-bed network model is shown in Figure 4. The 
Client is connected to ROUTER3 and the server is 
connected to ROUTER2 through their Ethernet ports. 
ROUTER1 and ROUTER4 are connected via their Ethernet 
using UTP cross cable. Other ports for the ROUTERS are 
connected via their WAN Interface Cards (WIC), namely 
WIC0 and WIC1. The clock rate on DCE (WIC1) terminal 
of each router is set to 800,000 Hz. 
 
Without authentication, the ROUTER1 configuration is 
shown in Figure 5. A major issue we faced during the setup 
of our model is the synchronization between the routers. 
The issue is that the hardware clock of individual routers is 
usually not synchronized. To overcome this problem, we 
configured one of the routers to host SNTP, namely 
ROUTER1, using the following commands: 
sntp server 192.168.102.2 
sntp broadcast client 
The last part of the configuration shows that ROUTER1 is 
hosting the Server Network Time Protocol (SNTP). Other 
routers configuration are done in a similar way except, they 
will adjust their time based on the SNTP router. Therefore, 
we executed the following commands on the remaining 
routers: 
ntp clock-period 10 
ntp server 192.168.102.2 
The IP addresses used are the same as those shown in the 
network model of Figure 4.  
Another major issue we faced the synchronization between 
the end-to-end nodes. For solving this problem, we used 
ClockSynch tool from PMSystem [13] at the end nodes to 

















Figure 5: ROUTER1 Configuration in the Unsecured 
Mode. 
 
In the case where authentication is used, ROUTER1 
configuration is shown in Figure 6. EIGRP routing 
authentication uses one secret key from the keychain as 
mentioned earlier. Before enabling authentication, a 
keychain and at least one key must be created. Creating a 
Keychain on ROUTER1 was done as follows: 
On ROUTER1 enter global configuration mode 
ROUTER1# configure terminal 
Create the key chain  
ROUTER1(config)# key chain khalidchain 
Specify the key number 
ROUTER1(config−keychain)# key 1 
Specify the key−string for the key 
ROUTER1(config−keychain−key)# key−string khalid-63 
End the configuration 
ROUTER1(config−keychain−key)# end 
 
We then configure EIGRP to perform MD5 authentication 
using this key as shown below: 
Enter global configuration mode 
ROUTER1# configure terminal 
From global configuration mode, specify the interface 
that you want to configure EIGRP message 
authentication on. In this case is Fastethernet 0 
ROUTER1(config)# interface fastethernet 0 
Enable EIGRP message authentication. The 100 used 
here is the autonomous system number of the network. 
md5 indicates that the md5 hash is to be used for 
authentication 
ROUTER1(config−if)#ip authentication mode eigrp 100 
md5 
Specify the keychain that should be used for 
authentication 





























ip address 192.168.1.1 255.255.255.0 
speed auto 
interface Serial0 
ip address 192.168.101.2 255.255.255.0 
interface Serial1 
ip address 192.168.102.2 255.255.255.0 
clockrate 800000 





ntp master 10 
sntp server 192.168.102.2 
sntp broadcast client 
hostname ROUTER1 
key chain khalidchain 
 key 1 
  key-string khalid-63 
  accept-lifetime 00:00:00 Oct 31 2007 infinite 
  send-lifetime 00:00:00 Oct 31 2007 infinite 
interface FastEthernet0 
 ip address 192.168.1.1 255.255.255.0 
ip authentication mode eigrp 100 md5 
 ip authentication key-chain eigrp 100 khalidchain 
 speed auto 
interface Serial0 
 ip address 192.168.101.2 255.255.255.0 
interface Serial1 
 ip address 192.168.102.2 255.255.255.0 
 clockrate 800000 
router eigrp 100 
 network 192.168.1.0 
 network 192.168.101.0 
 network 192.168.102.0 
 auto-summary 
ntp master 10 
sntp server 192.168.102.2 
sntp broadcast client 
 
5.2 The experiment model 
A Java-based Object-oriented discrete-event program with 
both client and server is implemented at the end nodes of 
the network model. The network traffic, namely TCP 
packets, is directed from the client to the server, which 
calculates the major performance measures, especially the 
average delay of the TCP packets. The packet data size is 
set to 1000 bytes and the generation of these packets 
follows the Markov Modulated Poisson Process (MMPP), 
which is a doubly stochastic Poisson process whose rate 
varies according to a Markov process. The MMPP can be 
viewed as a superposition of latent Poisson processes, 
which can be expressed as a non-homogeneous discretely 
indexed Hidden Markov Model (HMM) by partitioning 
time into intervals between observed events. The resultant 
traffic model is an ON/OFF traffic where the client sends 
bulk traffic during the ON periods and nothing during the 
OFF periods. ON and OFF periods are distributed 
exponentially with a mean of 10. The number of packets in 
bulk traffic is distributed normally with mean equals to 100 
and variance equals to 10.  
 
5.3 Test-bed model results 
Various traffic loads described by total number of packets 
sent during the sessions of the ON periods have been 
plugged into the simulation model. Initially a total of 
10,000 packets as a first traffic load incremented by 5,000 
packets up to 50,000 packets. 
 
 
Figure 7: Average Delay in Secured MD5 Authentication 
and Unsecured EIGRP Routing Protocol 
 
The results are shown in Figure 7, which indicates that the 
average delay in the secured case is continuously larger 
than it is in the unsecured case. The delay differences grow 
exponentially for the cases of 10,000 packets and up to 
40,000 packets. At the point of 40,000 packets, the 
differences between the secured and unsecured cases tend 
to become almost constant indicating the steady-state of the 
system.  
 
6 Conclusions and future work 
In this paper, we studied the performance of secured versus 
non-secured EIGRP routing protocol. For secured routing 
protocol, we used MD5 authentication. We first described 
an actual model for carrying out the experiment. The lack 
of authentication support found in router simulators has 
forced us to use the real test-bed model. A Java client-
server program for monitoring the traffic and reporting the 
delay time was presented as part of this work. The results 
obtained from the model and the program showed that the 
difference between the average delay in the secured case 
and the unsecured case has two phases: an exponential 
phase that ended at 40,000 packets, and a steady phase 
afterwards. During our investigation, we faced several 
problems, most notably the lack of simulators with built-in 
authentication commands and tools for synchronizing the 
client with the server. 
As future extension of the work presented in this paper, we 
are planning to apply the same techniques to some other 
routing protocols and compare the performance, hopefully 
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